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INTRODUCTION

The opioid epidemic kills an average of 91 Americans each day.1 In West
Virginia, 884 people died of drug overdoses in 2016 alone-the highest overdose
fatality rate in the nation, and one that is largely fueled by opioid abuse. 2 The
rate of drug overdoses has steadily grown during the first two decades of the 21st
century, and the problem only appears to be compounding.' For every one
opioid-related death, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

I
Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths - United
States, 2010-2015, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm655051el.pdf; cf HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET
AL.,
DRUG
OVERDOSE
DEATHS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
1999-2016
(2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf (finding that West Virginia had the highest
observed age-adjusted drug overdose death rates in 2016 (52.0 per 100,000)).
2
Eric Eyre, WVPanel to Develop Plan to Combat OpioidEpidemic, CHARLESTON GAZETTEMAIL (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/wv-panel-to-develop-plan-tocombat-opioid-epidemic/articlef2Obed97-cO9e-5205-9b5c-5bbefe0fDcda.html;
cf Eric Eyre,
Drug Firms Fueled 'Pill Mills' in Rural WV, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (May 23, 2016),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/copsandcourts/drug-firms-fueled-pill-mills-in-ruralwv/article_14c8ela5-19bl-579d-9ed5-770f09589a22.html.
3
This mirrors a national trend that "[t]he amount of prescription opioids sold to pharmacies,
hospitals, and doctors' offices nearly quadrupled from 1999 to 2010." Opioid Overdose:
Understanding
the
Epidemic,
CDC
(Aug.
30,
2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html; Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs:
Overdoses ofPrescriptionOpioidPainRelievers - UnitedStates, 1999-2008, 60 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
1487
(2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6043a4.htm. However, "there had not been
an overall change in the amount of pain that Americans reported." Hsien-Yen Chang et al.,
Prevalenceand Treatment ofPainin EDs in the UnitedStates, 2000 to 2010,32 AM. J. EMERGENCY
MED.
421, 427 (2014), http://www.ajemjoumal.com/article/S0735-6757(14)00021-7/pdf;
Matthew Daubresse et al., Ambulatory Diagnosis and Treatment of Non-Malignant Pain in the
United
States,
2000-2010,
51
MED.
CARE
870
(2013),
https://insights.ovid.com/pubmed?pmid=24025657.
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estimates that there are 150 people who abuse or are dependent on opioids.4 Fatal
overdoses from the nerve-pain drug gabapentin in West Virginia increased from
three in 2010 to 109 in 2016.1 That is a 3,600% increase in gabapentin deaths.
Overdose deaths related to methamphetamine in West Virginia increased by
500% in four years, with a record-number 129 people dying from meth-related
overdoses in 2017.6
As public money remains scarce, advocates must turn to private
resources for recovery and community renewal. Private employers can play a
more prominent role in supporting recovery by providing reasonable
accommodations that help workers remain employed while participating in
rehabilitation. Private-employer involvement is justified and appropriate
medically and legally because addiction is a disability, is defined as such under
disability anti-discrimination laws, and should be acknowledged as such in the
involvement is justified
private-employer
workplace. Furthermore,
economically and morally because the workplace has contributed to the
oversupply of opioids that fueled the present epidemic-notably through the
prolonged prescription of opioids (known as "opioid maintenance analgesia") in
the workers' compensation system.7 Opioids are disfavored by the medical
community as a method of long-term treatment for chronic pain.' Yet, privately
insured workers' compensation carriers have authorized extensive volumes of
opioids for long-term pain treatment.' When West Virginia privatized its
workers' compensation system beginning in 2004, private insurance carriers and

4
Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription Drug Overdoses - a U.S.
Epidemic,
61
MORBIDITY
AND
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
10
(2012),

https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6101a3.htm.
5
Eric Eyre, Opioid Alternative Linked to Spike in WV Overdose Deaths, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/custom/opioid-alternativelinked-to-spike-in-wv-overdose-deaths/article6e29cb9d-fl43-55d9-acOf-la0bc680d969.html.
6
Eric Eyre, Meth-Related Overdose Deaths Hit Record Number in WV, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/health/meth-relatedoverdose-deaths-hit-record-number-in-wv/article67cb7c01-fba3-5dbc-80c8-f9913e07dfde.html
7
See W. VA. CODE R. §§ 85-20-53.2-53.12 (2006).
8
Risks of Opioids .Outweigh Benefits for Headaches, Back Pain, Other Conditions, AM.
ACAD.
NEUROLOGY
(Sept.
29,
2014),
https://www.aan.com/PressRoom/Home/PRessRelease/1310.
9
Opioids constitute over a third of the total medical expenditure on workers' compensation
claims that were lengthier than three years. "[O]n average, workers' compensation prescription
drugs account for 19 percent of total medical spend, which equates to slightly less than 11 percent
of 'ultimate developed' total incurred claim costs." KEITH E. ROSENBLOOM, OPIOIDS WREAK
HAVOC

ON

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

COSTS

2

(2012),

http://www.lockton.com/Resource /PageResource/MKT/wc-pbm-3%20update%208-3 1.pdf
(citing Barry Lipton, Chris Laws, & Linda Li, Narcotics in Workers Compensation, NCCI
Holdings, Inc. (2009), https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Documents/II narcotics in-wc_1209.pdf).
"Opioids themselves account for an average of 25 percent of that pharmacy spend, and 35 percent
or greater for claims over three years old." Id.
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self-insured employers began exercising authority over how long an injured
worker should be on opioids-whereas previously those decisions were subject
to more rigorous public oversight through the Workers' Compensation
Commission.10
The U.S. response to the opioid epidemic has been hindered by the lack
of adequate support in the workplace as workers undergo rehabilitation and longterm recovery. Unaffordability and concerns over workplace repercussions are
among the most common reasons reported by untreated addicts for not receiving
treatment." Workers may also be embarrassed or fear what co-workers would
think if they knew of the addiction. Workers may be so broken that they lack
knowledge about recovery programs or are too functionally impaired to find such
programs. Successful recovery also requires developing stable peer groups apart
from other addicted friends. When workers lack sufficient workplace flexibility
and support, they may remain untreated, withdraw from treatment, or relapse into
active drug abuse.' 2
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 3 and West Virginia Human
Rights Act (WVHRA)1 4 protect addicts' rights by providing that no covered
employers may discriminate against addicted workers or job applicants because
of their addiction. These laws recognize that recovering drug addicts, and society
at large, are harmed by exclusion, discrimination, and unaccommodating
workplace conditions. By better utilizing these laws to ensure access to gainful
employment for recovering addicts, the labor and employment bar can make an
important contribution to resolving the vexing opioid epidemic.
II.

DETERMINING WHETHER THE ADDICT EMPLOYEE IS COVERED
BY THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
THE WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

Drug addicts and alcoholics hold legal rights as persons with a disability
if they meet a variety of legal tests. Generally, "standards governing the
1o
1

See W. VA. CODE R.

§ 85-20-53.12.d (2006).

See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. et al., RECEIPT OF SERVICES
FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PROBLEMS: RESULTS FROM THE 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE

AND HEALTH (2015),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DR-FRR32014/NSDUH-DR-FRR3-2014/NSDUH-DR-FRR3-2014.htm.
12
See generally U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SubstanceAbuse Under theADA, in SHARING
THE
DREAM:
Is
THE
ADA
ACCOMMODATING
ALL?
(2000),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ada/main.htm (stating that a recovering addict may be entitled to a
reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act which may include a

modified work schedule so that an employee may attend rehabilitation meetings) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9) (1994)).
13
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
14
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1 to § 5-11-20 (West 2018). We are using the WVHRA as
an example of how state human rights laws can complement the ADA.
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ADA . . and the WVHRA are coextensive" and often correspond to one
another." However, the Fourth Circuit acknowledges that the WVHRA
constitutes an "independent approach to the law of disability discrimination that
is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence.""
This section explores the protections for recovering addicts under those laws,
and highlights certain differences.
A.

Overview

To be disabled, the addicted worker must show that (1) the addiction
places a substantial limitation on one or more major life activities; (2) the worker
has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity due to
alcoholism or drug addiction; or (3) the worker is regarded by the employer as
being an alcoholic or drug addict.' 7 The regulations implementing the ADA
Amendments of 2008 explain that the definition of substantial limitation
provides for "expansive coverage . . to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of the ADA," and the regulations set forth extensive rules of construction
as to the wide-ranging definition of "substantially limits" -stating that proof of
a substantial limitation "usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical
analysis."" Likewise, ADA regulations expressly provide that "major life
activity" includes such conditions as "concentrating, thinking, communicating,
interacting with others," and brain function, which may be said plainly to arise
from addiction even where the addiction does not materially interfere with the

15
Shaferv. Preston Mem. Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274,281 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogatedonother
grounds by Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999); cf Cooper v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 870 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (S.D.W. Va. 1994); Thomas v. Shoney's, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 388,
390 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (citing Heston v. Marion Cty. Parks & Rec. Comm'n, 381 S.E.2d 253, 256
(W. Va. 1989)); Hosaflook v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1996 WL 717106, at *6-7 (W. Va. Dec. 10,
1996) (analyzing WVHRA claim under ADA framework); Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d
561, 1996 WL 391539, at *6-7 (W. Va. July 11, 1996) (same); but cf Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing
Home, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (W. Va. 1995) (observing that the Court had "consistently held that
cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act . .. are governed by the same analytical
framework and structures developed under Title VII . . . .").
16
See Calef v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 343 F. App'x 891, 896 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 538 S.E.2d 389, 404 (W. Va. 2000)).
17
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2018) (noting that a worker need not demonstrate a substantial
limitation to establish that he or she is "regarded as" disabled); cf Id. § 1630.1(c)(4) (noting the
broad definition of disability, as expanded by the 2008 ADA Amendments).
is
See id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ix).
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major life activity of working.19 The question "whether an individual meets the
definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis." 20
Assuming the worker can prove that his or her addiction substantially
limits a major life activity, 21 he or she has a record of being limited by such, or
is regarded as having an addiction (i.e., a disability), the worker may receive
workplace protections as a person with a disability under the ADA and WVHRA.
To prevail on a claim for failure to accommodate or for discrimination, the
worker must show that his or her addiction does not preclude performing the
essential functions of an available job (with a reasonable accommodation).
Furthermore, the worker must not violate the Current User Rules.22 As a matter
of law, the worker bears the burden of proving that he or she is, or is regarded
as, a qualified individual, with addiction as a disability, who is able to perform
the essential functions of the job with an accommodation.
B.

Current User Rules-and Safe Harborfor Workers
Enrolled in Rehabilitation

The Current User Rule is a method by which the employer-defendant
may dispute the plaintiff-worker's prima facie evidence that he or she is qualified
to perform the essential functions of the job.23 If a worker is "currently engaging
in the illegal use of drugs," he or she may lose protection under the ADA 24 and
possibly the WVHRA.25

19
See id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i)-(ii); cf W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-2.6 (1994) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of representative activities); EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL: TITLE I OF ADA § 2.1(a)(ii) (1992) [hereinafter EEOC],

https://askjan.org/links/ADAtaml.html.
20
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff under the ADA is "not
required . . to go into particulars about the life activity affected by [the] alleged disability or detail
the nature of [the] substantial limitations." Mary's House, Inc. v. North Carolina, 976 F. Supp. 2d
691, 702 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that plaintiffs' allegations that they were recovering addicts and previously homeless were
sufficient at the 12(b)(6) stage to support an inference that they were substantially limited in their
ability to work and care for themselves)); see also Bray v. Wake Forest, No. 5:14-CV-276-FL,
2015 WL 1534515, at *10-11 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2015); Rico v. Xcel Energy, Inc., 893 F. Supp.
2d 1165, 1168 (D.N.M. 2012); cf Hopkins v. MWR Mgmt. Co., No. 15 CVS 697, 2016 WL
2840305, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 13, 2016).
21
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) for detailed guidance on the meaning of "substantially limits"
under the ADA; cf W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-2.5 (2018).
22
See 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(m)
(West 2018); W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-2.1.
23
See Shafer v. Preston Mem'1 Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 98-3411, 1999 WL 58657, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 12114; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3.
25
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(m) (West 2018); W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-2.1 (2018).
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Federal and state laws provide similar but distinct rules for preventing
discrimination against drug addicts who are currently using. Under the ADA, the
standards for current users are in some sense stricter than they are under the
WVHRA; however, the ADA provides a generous "safe harbor" provision for
any drug addict who is currently enrolled in rehabilitation.2 6 The ADA contains
a broad exclusion allowing discrimination against anyone who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the discrimination occurs on the basis
of such use.27 By contrast, the WVHRA only allows discrimination against a
drug-addicted worker when the current usage actually operates to prevent such
worker from performing the duties of the job in question.2 8 This is a relatively
simple rule that provides more precise guidance for litigants than does the
nuanced, fact-specific inquiry under the ADA. 29
The WVHRA's Current User Rule is contained in the definition of
disability. In particular, it removes protections only for those addicts "whose
current use of or addiction to alcohol or drugs prevents such persons from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of
such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property
or the safety of others."30 Hence, while the WVHRA's and ADA's definitional
frameworks are generally congruent, the WVHRA's definition of disability
stands apart from the ADA's insofar as the state law provides a relatively more
lenient and worker-oriented Current User Rule to be applied by courts and
litigants.
The ADA's Current User Rule," which removes from protection "any
employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when
the employer acts on the basis of such use," has two parts and operates more
stringently than the WVHRA's version.32 First, to avoid being considered as
"currently engaging in illegal use of drugs," the addict must have been drug-free
for a significant period of time.33 In particular, an employee is a current user if

See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1)(2) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2012).
28
See W.VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(m)(3) (West 2018).
29
See infra Section II.B.2.
30
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(m) (West 2018).
31
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a); cf 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), (3)(A) (2012).
32
See Lyons v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., No. CCB-15-0232, 2016 WL 7188441, at *4 (D. Md.
Dec. 12, 2016).
3
See, e.g., Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 2011); Brown v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd.,
176 F.3d 847, 856 (5th Cir.1999); Shafer v. Preston Mem. Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 281 (4th
Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.
1999); Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 519 (2d Cir. 1991); Quinones
v. Univ. of P.R., No. 14-1331 JAG, 2015 WL 631327, at *5 (D. P.R. Feb. 13, 2015); Vedernikov
v. W. Va. Univ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 (N.D.W. Va. 1999); Andriacchi v. City of Chicago, No.
26

27
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he or she uses drugs "during the weeks and months" prior to an adverse
employment action, even if drug-free on the day of such action.34
Second, the length of abstinence is not necessarily dispositive; relatedly,
whether an employer could reasonably believe, at the time of discharge or other
adverse employment action, that drug use remained an ongoing problem is also
relevant." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")
Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of ADA
provides further perspective:
"Current" drug use means that the illegal use of drugs occurred
recently enough to justify an employer's reasonable belief that
involvement with drugs is an on-going problem. It is not limited
to the day of use, or recent weeks or days, in terms of an
employment action. It is determined on a case-by-case basis.36
Section 12114(a) applies to "the illegal use of drugs that has occurred recently
enough to indicate that the individual is actively engaged in such conduct." 37 The
Fourth Circuit has held that a drug addict is considered not to be currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs after one year of abstinence,38 although the
periodic use of illegal drugs during weeks and months prior to a discharge may
be considered current use.39 The Fourth Circuit further characterized the meaning
of "current" as "a periodic or ongoing activity in which a person engages."40
Furthermore, while the current use-if it is sufficiently recent in time-might
disqualify a drug addict, the ADA provides a so-called "Safe Harbor" provision
that helps to protect current users who are actively participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program.4 1 The ADA Safe Harbor Rule specifically provides that

CCB-15-0232, 1996 WL 685458, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1996); Baustian v. State of La., 910
F. Supp. 274, 277 (E.D. La. 1996); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321, 32829 (S.D. Miss. 1995), aff'd 74 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir. 1995); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr.,
869 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
34
Shafer, 107 F.3d at 278-79.
35
See id.; see also Mauerhan,649 F.3d at 1187; Zenor, 176 F.3d at 856.
36
EEOC, supra note 19, § 8.3 (cited by Vedernikov, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (Broadwater, J.));
cf EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ADDENDUM
(2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/adamanualadd.html.
37
29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 App. (1996) (cited by Vedernikov, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (Broadwater,
United States v. S. Mgmt Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 917-19 (4th Cir. 1992).
39
Vedernikov 55 F. Supp. 2d at 523; Shafer v. Preston Mem. Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278
(4th Cir. 1997).
40
Shafer, 107 F.3d at 278; cf Vedernikov, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2012); cf Clark v. Jackson Hosp. & Clinic, Inc., No. 2:12-CV836-WKW, 2013 WL 5347450, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2013).
38
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"those who have ceased using drugs and either begun or completed a supervised
rehabilitation program are qualified individuals."42
C. Actions that Employers Attempt to Take Against
Alcoholics and DrugAddicts
Employers are likely to contemplate taking a wide array of actions in
response to addiction. The ADA expressly sets forth an employer's permissible
actions. Any adverse action, coercion, interference, threats, harassment, or
intimidation that fall outside of the scope of these enumerated permissible actions
may be remediable by the aggrieved worker.43 The employer's express privileges
regarding drug-addicted employees include the following: prohibiting alcohol
and illegal-drug use at work; prohibiting employees from being under the
influence of drugs during working time; requiring employees to comply with
certain standards such as those set forth in the Drug-Free Workplace Act44 or
other laws required in the federal sector.45
Federal employment law is neutral on drug testing-neither encouraging
it nor providing that it constitutes per se discrimination based on addiction. In
particular, drug tests are not medical examinations for ADA purposes. 46 Further,
the validity of any employment decision associated with a drug test must be
evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the worker's
conduct and the employer's motivations and perceptions.47
State drug testing laws often add layers of complexity to the basic,
neutral position of drug testing under federal law. The West Virginia Safer
Workplace Act expanded firms' authority to test current or prospective workers
for drugs or alcohol. 48 The Act erects several requirements for a company's
testing policy. Employers must provide employees, when requested or as
42
Clark, 2013 WL 5347450, at *6 (emphasis omitted); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr.,
869 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D. Miss.1994).
43
29 C.F.R. § 1630.12 (2018).
44
41 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8103 (2012).
45
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b), (c).
46
42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(1).
47
See Martin v. Estero Fire Rescue, No. 213-cv-393-FtM-29DNF, 2014 WL 2772339, at *4
(M.D. Fla. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss ADA discrimination complaint by firefighter who
registered positive on a drug test, informed his employer that the positive result was due to
disabling anxiety, and requested counseling as a reasonable accommodation for the disability-yet
the employer then fired him instead of providing the accommodation); Rosado v. Am. Airlines,
743 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51-52 (D.P.R. 2010) (concluding that employer had legitimate business
reasons for terminating clerk based on his history of drug tests positive for cocaine and failing to
report for retest); Jones v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 993 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (D. Kan. 1998)
(denying motion to dismiss claim of an employee who was erroneously regarded as disabled when
he allegedly inaccurately tested positive for marijuana).
48
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3E-1 to -16 (West 2018).
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appropriate, with information regarding the availability of counseling, employee
assistance, rehabilitation, and/or other drug abuse treatment programs which the
employer offers.4 9 If a worker wishes to challenge the results of his or her initial
sample test result, that person has the right to have the split sample tested by
another laboratory."o
The Safer Workplace Act provides that "to qualify for a bar from being
subjected to legal claims for acting in good faith on the results of a drug or
alcohol test, employers must adhere to the accuracy and fairness safeguards
outlined in [the Act]."s An employer with a drug testing policy may violate the
WVHRA or ADA if it fails to offer the requisite information on counseling or
treatment to workers who test positive and then denies the known addict a
reasonable accommodation to pursue such employer-sponsored counseling,
rehab, treatment programs, or other treatment options.
D. ProvingDisabilityfor Drug Addicts and Alcoholics
1. Difficulties Proving Disability by Showing a Current, Substantial
Limitation of a Major Life Activity
A plaintiff-worker may demonstrate a disability by showing that his or
her addiction currently places a substantial limitation on one or more major life
activities. Wintz v. Cabell County Commission5 2 and Chamberlainv. Securian
Financial Group, Inc.' 3 demonstrate the logical and legal challenges of
establishing that a drug-addicted worker has a current, substantial limitation on
a major life activity and is able to perform the job duties. 54 In Wintz, the court
analyzed a failure to accommodate claim for an alcoholic, paying extended
attention to the substantial-limitation test." There, the worker's doctor released
her to return to work without restrictions regarding her alcoholism." The worker
claimed she could perform every basic life function at the time she was
terminated.57 The court found no evidence that the worker was either actually

§ 21-3E-7(8)(a).

49

Id.

50

Id. §21-3E-7(6).

51

Id. § 21-3E-4.
No. 3:15-11696, 2016 WL 7320887 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 15, 2016).

52

180 F. Supp. 3d 381 (W.D.N.C. 2016).
Wintz, 2016 WL 7320887, at *5; Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 398-400. For more
detailed guidance on "substantially limits," see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2018); W. VA. CODE R.
§ 77-1-2.5 (1994). For more guidance on "major life activity," see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); W. VA.
CODER. § 77-1-2.6.
5s
Wintz, 2016 WL 7320887, at *5.
56
Id. at *1.
53

54

5

Id. at *5.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss3/9

10

Petsonk and Lofaso: Working for Recovery: How the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Workingfor Recovery

2018]

901

disabled or perceived as being disabled at the time she was terminated within the
meaning of the WVHRA. 8
The court did not, however, analyze whether the worker was "disabled"
based on having a "record of impairment" that previously substantially limited a
major life activity.5 9 The court instead simply found that the employer presented
ample evidence to show that the worker's alcohol dependence prevented her
from doing the job duties-processing mental health petitions-because, as the
court further found, mistakes in processing medically sensitive materials raised
serious safety concerns.60 Therefore, the employer was not required to
accommodate her for alcohol dependence.61
In Chamberlain, the court applied the substantial-limitation test in
analyzing a wrongful discharge claim because of alcoholism disability in the
context of an insurance salesman's disruptive behavior while on a
complementary cruise the salesman earned as a job-performance reward.62 The
court found that the worker did not articulate how his alcohol impairment
"substantially limit[ed]" his ability to perform any "major life activities."6 The
employee had been sober for nine years before relapsing a few months before the
cruise incident. 64 The court declined to analyze whether the testimony regarding
the worker's enrollment in a treatment program described a substantial limitation
on the worker's other major life activities besides that of working, such as
concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, or other brain
functions.6 1

The Chamberlain court speciously concluded, without analyzing the
limitations on brain function that caused the worker to seek substance abuse
treatment, that there was no evidence as to how the worker's alcoholism was
currently placing a substantial limitation on any major life activities, and that the
worker was thus disabled due either to a current impairment or a record of

.

5
See Syl. Pt. 2, Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 575 (W. Va. 1996) (explaining
that "[t]o state a claim for breach of the duty of reasonable accommodation under the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE, 5-11-9 (1992), a plaintiff must allege the following elements:
(1) The plaintiff is a qualified person with a disability . .
5
See Wintz, 2016 WL 7320887, at *5-6.
60

Id.

61

Id. at *6.

Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 388-89, 397-400.
63
Id. at 397-99; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2018); Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
64
See Chamberlain Dep. at 133-43 (# 23) at 61-62, (# 33-1) at 13, Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp.
3d at 381, (No. 3:14-cv-00453), 2015 WL 13504999. The plaintiff also argued that his alcohol
addiction had no effect on his job performance. See, e.g., Pl. Resp. (#33) at 20-21, Chamberlain,
180 F. Supp. 3d at 381, (No. 3:14-cv-00453), 2015 WL 13504999.
65
See Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 387.
62
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impairment.66 Consequently, the Chamberlain court's analysis failed to
adequately consider the full spectrum of major life activities, the full spectrum
of impairments arising from addiction, or whether a record of impairment had
existed in years past."7
2. Difficulties Proving Disability by a Record of Impairment
A plaintiff-worker may show a record of impairment by demonstrating
that the addiction has a record of substantially limiting a major life activity, even
if it no longer does. In general, an individual has a record of a disability if the
individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.68
The ADA implementing regulations clarify that the concept of "record of
impairment" is intended to have a broad construction.6 9 A non-using drug addict
with a record of impairment is entitled to a reasonable accommodation even if
his or her addiction does not currently substantially limit a major life activity. 70
The Chamberlaincase suggests that a worker may struggle to distinguish
a claim of an actual, current impairment from that of record of prior impairment;
however, if that distinction is clearly drawn, the evidence in favor of the worker's
disability can come into compelling focus.
By contrast, in Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc.,n the Third Circuit
upheld a jury's determination that an employee's absence from work during
cancer treatments provided a record of being substantially limited in the major
life activities of working and thinking, and that the employer relied on that
66
The court confused the first two prongs of disability, stating: "Because there is no evidence
as to how Plaintiff's alcoholism "substantially limits" any major life activities, Plaintiff does not
meet the definition of disabled on either the first or second prongs." Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp. 3d
at 399.
67
Id. at 400.
68
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (2018).
69
Id. § 1630.2(k)(2) ("Broad construction. Whether an individual has a record of an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly to the
maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive analysis. An individual
will be considered to have a record of a disability if the individual has a history of an impairment
that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the
general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment. In determining whether
an impairment substantially limited a major life activity, the principles articulated in paragraph ()
of this section apply.") (emphasis added); id. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (disability does not have to prevent or
severely restrict an activity to be substantially limiting).
70
See id. § 1630.2(k)(3) ("An individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment
may be entitled, absent undue hardship, to a reasonable accommodation if needed and related to
the past disability."); cf Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 127 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.
1997) ("[P]ast drug addiction, not merely past use, is required to make out a claim under the
ADA.") (emphasis in original), vacated on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.1998).
n1
554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009).
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disability in its decision to terminate her.72 The Eshelman court cited the
following four pieces of evidence to support its decision. First, the employer's
medical department's files documented the employee's symptoms and cancer
treatment.73 Second, the employer received a written note from the worker's
doctor stating that she had significant cognitive dysfunction, referred to as
"chemo brain," and that she suffered from short-term memory loss after she
returned to work. 74 Third, the employee's direct supervisors were aware of her
chemotherapy-related memory problems (based on the worker's testimony that
she told her supervisors "I have this problem that I can't retain things in my short75
term memory" and "I have to write this down, so that it doesn't disappear").
Fourth, the employer's proffered reasons for terminating the worker included her
inability to travel, which was a memory-based inability, and which the jury could
have deemed a substantial limitation (e.g., limiting the major life activities of
thinking, working, concentrating, communicating, interacting with others).76
While demonstrating a record of impairment in the past is simpler than
showing the ongoing nature of the impairment, the flipside of this consideration
for the plaintiff-worker is that the medical records of the impairment cannot be
so remote in time as to be unreliable. For instance, in Dismore v. Seaford School
District,77 a school bus driver with a remote childhood history of depression and
7
attention deficit disorder was found to have no "record of impairment." The
driver's early childhood records, which were allegedly held by the defendant but
were never produced in the record of the case, were inadequate to demonstrate
79
that the worker had a record of substantial limitation on a major life activity.
Thus, the "record of' prong may be an asset to the worker so long as the medical
treatment records are actually available as evidence and contain a reliable
measure of detail to support a conclusion that the worker has a record of
impairment.s 0
3.

Difficulties Proving Disability by Showing "Regarded as" Disabled

A plaintiff-worker may show that he or she is "regarded as" having a
physical or mental impairment. A worker

72

Id at 436.

73

Id. at 438.

74

Id. at 430-3 1.

7

Id. at 438.
Id. at 438-39.

76
7

532 F. Supp. 2d 656 (D. Del. 2008).

78

79

Id. at 663-64.
Id.

so

See id

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LA WRE VIEW

904

[Vol. 120

meets the requirement of "being regarded as having such an
impairment" if the individual establishes that he or she has been
subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of
an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether
or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity."
Accordingly, "an individual is disabled if regarded as such, whether or
not he in fact has a substantially limiting impairment." 8 2 That is, the worker need
only show that the employer believed that the worker had a mental or physical
impairment, not that such impairment affected him or her to any specific degree.
Under the "regarded as" prong, the employer's perception about the worker is
the court's pivotal inquiry.83 The employer's knowledge should be proven by
facts about addiction that were clearly revealed to or acknowledged by the
employer.8 4
Rocha v. Coastal CarolinaNeuropsychiatricCrisisServices" illustrates
the difficulties a worker may have in making an adequate showing under the

"regarded as" prong.8 6 There, a mental health worker was fired after he failed to
disclose three felony convictions for possessing illegal drugs.87 The court held
that the worker's disclosure of criminal drug use during his youth did not have a
"logical nexus" to the employer's alleged view that the worker was a drug
addict." The court explained that, while the worker alleged that he had attended
out-patient addiction recovery meetings following his three convictions, he did
not allege that his employer knew about that treatment for drug addiction." The

81

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012).

A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 515 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing
Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 1998)); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2) (2018)
("Whether an individual's impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity is not relevant to
coverage under paragraph (g)(1)(iii) (the 'regarded as' prong) of this section.").
83
See Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that under the ADA, a
plaintiff only had to show at summary judgment that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the employer "regarded him as having a mental or physical impairment ... [and] was not
required to present evidence of how or to what degree [the employer] believed the impairment
affected him"); Horsham v. Fresh Direct, 136 F. Supp.3d 253, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Whether an
individual is regarded as having a disability turns on the employer's perception of the employee
and is therefore a question of intent, not whether the employee has a disability.") (internal citations
and quotations omitted); Sowell v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 139 F. Supp.3d 684, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
("What is relevant here is the employer's perception.").
84
See Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 611-12 (10th Cir. 1998).
82

85
86
87
88
89

979 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D.N.C. 2013).
See id. at 678-79.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 678-79.
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court added that even if the plaintiff-mental-health worker had established a
prima facie case of "regarded as" disability discrimination under the ADA, the
employer offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge: the
worker had misstated a material fact on his employment application by
90
representing that he had no criminal convictions.
Chamberlain,by contrast, provides an example of a worker succeeding
under the "regarded as" prong. There, the worker contended that the terms that
defendants sought to impose as probationary conditions of his employment
showed that he was "regarded as" an alcoholic by his employer and punished for
his impairment.91 The probationary terms included conditions not imposed on
other employees, such as documenting the worker's attendance at Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, submitting to random drug tests, and applying a zero92
tolerance policy for drug and alcohol use both on and off the job. Citing the
ADA's instruction that "[t]he definition of disability ... shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent
93
permitted by the terms of this chapter," and evidence that could lead a jury to
find that defendants regarded the employee as having an impairment, the court
found that the plaintiff made the requisite showing that an issue of material fact
94
existed as to whether he was "regarded as" disabled. Ultimately, the
employee's success in showing that he was regarded as disabled was not
dispositive in his favor because the court concluded that the employer had
successfully shown that the probationary agreement was non-discriminatory and
non-pretextual. 95
96
In Sternkopf v. White Plains Hospital, a worker alleged that his
based on his "substance
employer discriminated against him under the ADA
97
court found that the
The
disorder.
bipolar
and
injuries,
abuse," orthopedic
having pled only that
addicted,
ever
was
he
that
worker failed to expressly allege
98
failed to consider
Sternkopf
in
court
The
he suffered from "substance abuse."
as," which
"regarded
vis-A-vis
the EEOC's regulatory rule of construction

90

Id. at 679; see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)

(2012).
91

Chamberlain v. Securian Fin. Grp., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d 381, 389 (W.D.N.C. 2016).

94

See id at 399.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
Id. at 399-400.

95

See Chamberlain, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 400-04 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

92
93

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
96

No. 14-CV-4076 (CS), 2015 WL 5692183 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015).

97

Id. at *6-7.

See id at 6 (citing Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 127 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.
98
1997); Skinner v. Amsterdam, 824 F. Supp. 2d 317, 330-31 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (reciting detailed
facts of pro se plaintiff's addiction to painkillers, and evaluating an addiction-based hostile work
environment claim under the ADA pursuant to Harrisv. ForklftSys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)).
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provides that "an individual is 'regarded as having such an impairment' if the
individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially
limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity." 99 Sternkopf
thus illustrates the peril that may befall a "regarded as" claim if the court is not
keenly aware that such a claim need not satisfy the "substantially limits" and
"major life activity" tests.
Taken together, these cases clarify that the "regarded as" prong is an
important aspect of the statutes' efforts to prevent discrimination based on
unfounded perceptions of drug addiction.
III. CAUSES OF ACTION FOR THE DRUG ADDICT

A. Failureto Accommodate
As a threshold matter, it is important to note the circumstances that
operate to deprive the recovering addict of a livelihood, but which the duty to
accommodate may help to alleviate. Recovering addicts' highest priority must
be to recover from the disease of addiction because failure to properly curb the
addiction is bound to result in relapse. Those in recovery may have already
experienced the loss of loved ones through divorce or alienation, economic
devastation resulting from debts used to finance the addiction, and interpersonal
conflict during substance abuse.' 00 Working while recovering can only create
added stress for a recovering addict."1' Further, recovering addicts may have lost
their jobs because of their addiction or their addiction was triggered by job loss.
Unemployment and the search for employment are themselves additional
stressors. Moreover, the longer that an addict is out of work, the greater the risk
that treatment becomes unaffordable. Thus, both having a job and not having a
job contribute to a stressful environment that may interfere with recovery.
Reasonable accommodations for recovering addicts may include parttime schedules to support inpatient or outpatient behavioral therapy, and may
also include flex time or intermittent leave to participate in random drug
screenings, rehab sessions, Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous meetings,
physical activity,1 02 medically-assisted treatment (combining behavioral therapy
with medications, such as Suboxone, to treat substance abuse disorders), or other
recovery-related appointments. It is particularly important for the recovering

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(2) (2018).
See Rajita Sinha R & Ania M. Jastreboff, Stress as a Common Risk FactorforObesity and
Addiction, 73 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 827-35 (2013).
101
See Michael G. Marmot, Status Syndrome: A Challenge to Medicine, 295 [J]AMA 1304-07
(2006).
102
See Mark A. Smith & Wendy J. Lynch, Exercise as a PotentialTreatmentfor DrugAbuse:
Evidencefrom PreclinicalStudies, 2 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY 82 (2011).
9

100
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addict to obtain these accommodations, thereby preventing permanent job loss
while permitting the addict to curb the disease of addiction and to work
productively.
To establish a claim for failure to accommodate under the WVHRA, the
worker must prove the following:
(1) the [worker was] a qualified person with a disability; (2) the
employer was aware of the [worker's] disability; (3) the
[worker] required an accommodation in order to perform the
essential functions of [his or her] job; (4) a reasonable
accommodation existed that [would have] met [his or her]
needs; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the
[worker's] need[s] and of the accommodation; and (6) the
employer failed to provide [an] accommodation [that would
have permitted the worker to remain in the position at issue].103
Similarly, to establish a claim for failure to accommodate under the
ADA, a worker must prove that (1) he or she "qualifies as an 'individual with a
disability;"' (2) the employer had notice of the disability; (3) he or she "could
perform the essential functions of [his or] her job with a reasonable
accommodation;" and (4) the employer "refused to make any reasonable
accommodation."' 04 Under the ADA, a worker who qualifies as a person with a
disability based only on the "regarded-as" prong is not entitled to a reasonable
accommodation.10 5

An employer has "a good-faith duty to engage with [its employee] in an
interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation," and courts must in
turn review the accommodation on a case-by-case basis.1 06 Determining whether
an accommodation is reasonable "requires a fact-specific, individualized

Williams v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 592 S.E.2d 794, 797 n.2 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting
Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 575 (W. Va. 1996)); see W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4
(1994).
104
Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015) (analyzing
elements under Rehabilitation Act); accord 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); Wilson v. Dollar Gen.
Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209,
212-13 (4th Cir. 1994); cf Mobley v. Advance Stores Co., 842 F. Supp. 2d 886, 889 (E.D. Va.
2012) (citing Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001)) (cited by Garrett v. Aegis
Commc'ns Grp., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-13, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88376, at *7-8 (N.D. W. Va. June
29, 2014)).
1os
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e) (2018).
106
See Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 580 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
13 § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)
C.F.R.
29
(2012); School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (requiring review on caseby-case basis); Champ v. Baltimore Cty., 884 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Md. 1995) (mem.).
103
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analysis of the disabled individual's circumstances."' 0 7 For incumbent workers,
scenarios that could give rise to claims for failure to accommodate include
employers denying the flexibility to complete rehabilitation or to report for the
administration of medically assisted treatment. That is, a worker may have a
disabling addiction-or a record of such addiction-that substantially limits his
or her concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, or other
brain functions. That worker may require an accommodation to prevent the
addiction from compromising his or her ability to perform the essential functions
of the job. For job applicants, scenarios could involve not being able to
participate in a continuous multi-day interview or orientation sessions due to
mandatory reporting for random drug testing or similar reporting requirements
connected to rehabilitation.
The legal claim for a failure to accommodate represents a powerful tool
for workers who are recovering addicts, drug counselors, and family members of
recovering addicts. Individuals in recovery may consider filing charges for
failure to accommodate even before any escalated adverse action occurs, so they
can pre-emptively protect their livelihood while remaining in treatment.
B. Discriminationor DisparateTreatment
Discrimination against drug addicts can arise in various settings at the
workplace. The employer may fail to promote or refuse to provide a raise for the
incumbent worker. Employers may discriminate against a job applicant based on
his or her appearance (such as tattoos depicting drug paraphernalia), a resume or
other information that indicates the applicant had participated (or is participating)
in rehabilitation programs, or unexplained gaps in a resume implying prior
rehabilitation.
Lopreato v. Select Specialty HospitalNorthern Kentucky'0 8 was an ADA
discrimination case brought by nurses who were refused job offers after having
previously lost their licensure due to drug addiction. In that case, the nurses
alleged discrimination, but failed to allege that the employer-hospital treated
them differently than similarly situated applicants who were not disabled. 1I The
hospital did not hire any non-disabled applicants who had prior restrictions on

107
Runyon v. Hannah, No. 2:12-1394, 2013 WL 2151235, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. May 16, 2013)
(citing Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Crowder v.
Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.1996)); accordPandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d
823, 833 (4th Cir. 1994). In Pandazides,a case under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§
701-718, which prevents disability discrimination by federal agencies and federal contractors, the
court declared "the various elements of a Rehabilitation Act claim alleging employment
discrimination, including the reasonableness of any accommodations, to be questions of fact."
Runyon, 2013 WL 2151235, at *4.
108
640 F. App'x 438 (6th Cir. 2016).
109
Id. at 443.
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110
their licenses arising from misconduct that was unrelated to drug abuse.
Relying on those facts, the Sixth Circuit found that "an employer's decision to
reject an applicant because the applicant did not have a neutral characteristic
which the employer requires of all employees is legitimate and
nondiscriminatory, even if the rejected applicant lacks the desired characteristic
because he is disabled.""' Accordingly, the hospital's practice was legitimate
and nondiscriminatory because its practice applied equally to all nurses with
current or prior restrictions on their licenses. 1 12
Discrimination claims play an important role in reducing the social costs
of addiction and recovery by promoting workforce participation by recovering
addicts and alcoholics. These claims may indirectly increase the availability of
reasonable accommodations, and thus keep workers on the job, because
employers have an incentive to avoid causing damages and incurring litigation
expenses for failing to accommodate or for discharging an employee who is
disabled because of alcoholism or drug addiction. When an addicted worker is
discharged, the lack of income and associated stress may aggravate the risks of
relapse. Securing relief for discrimination in such situations can assist workers
financially and emotionally in restoring them to the pathway of successful longterm recovery.

C. DisparateImpact

"

Disparate impact is proven by "(1) demonstrating that the employer uses
a particular employment practice or policy and (2) establishing that such
particular employment practice or policy causes a disparate impact on a class
protected [from discrimination]."ll 3 If the plaintiff-worker establishes this
burden, then the employer must prove that the practice or policy is "jobrelated"
and "consistent with business necessity."ll 4 The worker can then rebut the
defense by "showing that a less burdensome alternative practice exists which the
employer refuses to adopt." 1
To demonstrate disparate impact of a policy or practice, the proper
statistical comparison is between the composition of protected class members
among the qualified persons in the labor market and the composition of protected
class members holding the job or jobs at issue for the aggrieved worker or

110

Id

I

Id.
Id.

112

Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting West
Virginia Univ. v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1994)); cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012).
114
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); Barefoot, 457 S.E.2d at 159.
113

1s

Id. at 166.
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class. 1 16 Employers disparately impact drug addicts by using employment tests
that exclude drug addicts, or by adopting work rules that prohibit workers from
taking intermittent leave to participate in random drug testing or treatment (if
such work rules are not essential given the duties of the job).
Disparate impact claims for addicts under the ADA should be developed
and pleaded in light of Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez." 7 Raytheon fired an
employee for failing an employer-administered drug test." 8 The employee
successfully completed a drug rehab program, remained drug free for an
extended period of time, and then sought re-employment." 9 However, the
employer denied his application based upon its policy against rehiring employees
who had been fired for cause. 120 The Ninth Circuit held that the no-rehire policy,
although non-discriminatory on its face, was unlawful as applied because it had
the potential to discriminate against employees who were lawfully forced to
resign for illegal drug use but have since been rehabilitated.121 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff had not timely developed a disparate
impact case and that the facts did not constitute disparate treatment-i.e.,
reliance on the employer's "no-rehire" policy, even when applied to persons with
disabilities, was a legitimate reason for declining to rehire the plaintiff, absent
evidence that the policy was instituted for the purpose of excluding individuals
with disabilities or that it was used in this case as a pretext to exclude the plaintiff
because of his disability.1 22 Raytheon indicates that disparate impact claims may
be just as viable for workers suffering from substance abuse disorders as they are
for any others. Disparate impact claims can be directed towards employment
policies, hiring tests, and similar gate-keeping devices that tend to exclude
groups of addicts en masse from equitable access to the workplace.
D. Defenses
Plaintiffs may find themselves contending with two affirmative defenses
that operate somewhat differently for addicts than they do for other disability

See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989) (applied by Syl. Pt.
3, Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 88 (W. Va. 1989),
overruled on other grounds, W. Va. Univ./W. Va. Bd. of Regents v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259 (W.
Va. 1994)); cf Pittsnogle v. W.Va. Dept. of Transp., 605 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va. 2004).
117
540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003) (comparing disparate impact with disparate treatment for a worker
disabled by addiction); cf Vargo v. Nat'l Exch. Carriers Ass'n, Inc., 870 A.2d 679, 690-91 (Super.
Ct. N.J. 2005).
"
Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 47.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 50.
122
Id. at 53-54.
116
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claims: the "direct threat" defense and the undue hardship defense.1 23 While these
defenses are not couched in strictly identical terms in the state and federal
statutes, they operate in a similar manner under the ADA and WVHRA. This
Section presents an overview of these defenses to highlight their relevance to
claims by drug addicts. Further reading will yield important guidance for the
practitioner and scholar alike, especially as to additional defenses that arise
commonly in disability claims such as the business necessity defense under the
ADA and the bona fide occupational qualification defense under the WVHRA. 124
1.

Direct Threat

Under the ADA, an employer need not accommodate employees who
pose a direct threat to themselves or others. 125 The "direct threat" defense has
123
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012) (occupational qualifications); id. § 12113(b)
(direct threat); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (undue hardship). Direct threat means

"significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot

be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2018); cf 42
U.S.C. § 12111(3) (statutory definition); 42 U.S.C § 12113(b).
The determination that an individual poses a "direct threat" [is] based on an

individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform
the essential functions of the job . . . [and] a reasonable medical judgment that
relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available

objective evidence.

..

. [F]actors to be considered include: [] duration of the

risk; [] nature and severity of the potential harm; [] likelihood that the potential
harm will occur; and [] imminence of the potential harm.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The WVHRA generally employs definitions of a direct threat that are
coextensive with those under the ADA. See W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4.7, 4.8 (1994).
124
See Calef v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 343 F. App'x 891, 896 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 404 (W. Va. 2000); cf 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9 (West 2018); W. VA.
CODE R. § 77-1-4.10 to -4.15. Defenses to claims of failure to accommodate, disparate treatment,
and disparate impact are set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012) ("It may be a defense to a charge
of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an

individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under

this subchapter.").
125
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2). In the Fourth Circuit, the
"direct threat" issue is treated as an affirmative defense whereby the defendant has the burden of
establishing that plaintiff presented a direct threat to himself or others. See Darcangelo v. Verizon

Commc'ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2002), appliedby Cousin v. United States, 230 F.
Supp. 3d 475, 492, n.11 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff'd, 691 F. App'x 780 (4th Cir. 2017); cf Mullins v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. TJS-14-2698, 2017 WL 784120, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 1,
2017) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002)). However, note that there
has been a circuit split on the question of whether the direct threat defense is an affirmative defense
or a prima-facie component of a claim. See generally Sarah R. Christie, AIDS, Employment, and
the Direct Threat Defense: The Burden ofProofand the Circuit Court Split, 76 FORDHAM L. REv.

235, 236 (2007).
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been relied upon to exclude non-current drug addicts from "safety sensitive" jobs
or jobs where they have ready access to controlled substances. 126 Although an
employee may not have a sufficiently current drug addiction to remove his or her
classification as a person with a disability, there are nonetheless circumstances
in which the employer's perception about the gravity of the non-current drug
addiction can effectively remove the person's protection under the ADA. In
Altman v. New York City Health Hospitals Corp.,'127 a physician who served as
the Chief of the Department of Internal Medicine at Metropolitan Hospital in
East Harlem had successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program and
there was no evidence of current use of alcohol. Nonetheless, based on the danger
of relapse, the difficulty of detecting a relapse, and the danger that a relapse
would impose on patients, the court in the Southern District of New York found
that the hospital was justified in concluding that reinstating the doctor would
pose a "direct threat to the health and safety of others." 28
2. Undue Hardship: The Reasonable Accommodation Would Cause
Employer to Suffer an Undue Hardship
Employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations unless
would cause an undue hardship on the employer. 129 While
accommodation
such
a particular accommodation may be reasonable in most cases, there may be
extenuating circumstances for a given employer, at a given time, under particular
circumstances, that create such a hardship. The existence of an undue hardship
turns on the particular employer's resources, and on whether the accommodation
is unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or would fundamentally alter the
nature or operation of the business. 3 0
As a general rule, an employer must allow an alcoholic or drug-addicted
worker to obtain treatment and miss work-as it would any disabled workerunless the employer can prove that such a leave of absence would cause undue

See The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Applying Performance and Conduct Standards to
Employees with Disabilities,U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, § III.B, III.D. & n. 87,
https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html#alcohol (last modified Dec. 20, 2017)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)(3) and (5)). See generally Paula Barran, So Which PositionsAre
AM),
1:00
2008,
23,
(May
OREGON
DJC
Sensitive?,
Safety
(describing
http://djcoregon.com/news/2008/05/23/so-which-positions-are-safety-sensitive/
criteria in determining which jobs are "safety-sensitive" under the ADA).
127
903 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996).
128
Id. at 509.
129
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d).
130
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (setting forth factors for
determining undue hardship); cf W. VA. CODE R. § 77-1-4.6 (setting forth undue hardship factors
under WVHRA).
126
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hardship.' 3 1 Congress has determined that it is not unduly burdensome for
employers to provide workers with the necessary flexibility to tend to their
medical needs such as a disabling drug addiction.' 32 Congress has further
determined that uninterrupted attendance at work in the face of a family medical
emergency is not a necessary job requirement and does not unduly burden
employers. 133
Rodgers v. Lehman'34 illustrates an accommodation framework that the
Fourth Circuit found not to cause undue hardship on a large employer, and the
case provides an exemplary model of a five-step reasonable accommodation for
recovering addicts. This consolidated appeal of two cases, arising under section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 3 5 involved federal employees who were
alcoholics and whose employers had treated their addictions leniently, but had
nonetheless denied them the chance to take extended periods of leave for
inpatient treatment programs before being discharged from their jobs.' 3 6
The Court held that the employers must "afford [the addicted employee]
an opportunity to participate in an inpatient program, using accrued or unpaid
leave, unless the [employer] can establish that it would suffer an undue hardship
from the employee's absence."' 37 The Court outlined a five-step process that an
employer must provide as a reasonable accommodation for an addicted worker
whose non-disqualifying addiction-related conduct continually violates
workplace policies. The five-step process represents an accommodation that
ensures appropriate treatment and support for the worker in recovery, without
causing an undue hardship: (1) upon employer learning of or suspecting
addiction, "inform the employee of available counselling services," (2) if
unsatisfactory job performance continues, employer must "clearly and
unequivocally warn the employee that unsatisfactory job performance caused by
[addiction] will result in discipline," (3) "employee must be permitted to
See Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253,259(4th Cir. 1989); McElrath v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp.
131
23, 27 (D.D.C. 1989); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 949 (D.D.C. 1988); Bonnie
McClure v. AT&T Corp., & Nan Hutsenpiller, No. 04-C-1915, 2005 WL 5455537 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 20, 2005) (Zakaib, J.) (case involving failure to accommodate and discrimination based

upon a mental impairment, arising under WVHRA, citing ADA cases for proposition that leave for
treatment is a reasonable accommodation under the WVHRA).
132
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 353 (reports on the ADA by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human

Resources and the House Committee on Education and Labor).

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994) (outlining the details of the Family and Medical Leave
133
Act); see also Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782-83 (6th Cir. 1998)
("Medical leave as an accommodation is not a novel concept.... [A] medical leave of absence can
constitute a reasonable accommodation under appropriate circumstances.").
134
869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (Motz, J., sitting by designation).
136

29 U.S.C. § 791 (2012).
Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259-60.

137

Id. at 259.

135
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participate initially in outpatient treatment," (4) if the employee does not succeed
in the outpatient treatment, "the [employer] must, before discharging [the
worker], afford [them] an opportunity to participate in an inpatient program,"
and (5) "if the employee completes the program but thereafter relapses, and as a
result fails to perform his job satisfactorily, a decision by the [employer] to
discharge him will be presumed to be reasonable."l 38 "Only in a rare case, such
as where a recovering alcoholic has had a single relapse after a prolonged period
of abstinence, can this presumption be rebutted." 3 9
This five-step approach gives the worker a fair process by which he or
she can participate in recovery while maintaining a job. The Court summed up
this point, stating "[e]xcessive sensitivity is no more conducive to a cure than is
undue rigor, and in the final analysis 'reasonable accommodation' is the
establishment of a process which embodies a proper balance between the two."l 4 0
IV. CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Reasonable job accommodations for recovering addicts, and preventing
discrimination in the hiring and supervision of drug-addicted workers, can play
vital roles in reducing the rate of relapse and combatting the substance abuse
epidemic. The labor and employment bar should join with the advocacy
community to promote the availability of reasonable accommodations for drug
addicts. Private employers represent an indispensable source of payors for
patient services to support recovery and drug treatment, and the provision of
reasonable accommodations provides a mechanism for accessing those payors.
Regulatory and legislative reforms can enhance the impact of private
litigation in combatting the opioid crisis. Regulatory agencies that oversee
workers' compensation and health insurance can prioritize the provision of
physical therapy and other non-pharmaceutical modalities for the treatment of
pain. Even though workers' compensation has been privatized in West Virginia,
the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (O.I.C.) does retain the authority to
oversee private decisions regarding long-term pain medication "as
applicable."l 4 ' The O.I.C. should exercise its authority to require private carriers
and self-insured employers to provide greater transparency about their opioidrelated treatment decisions.' 42 The O.I.C.'s Industrial Council should conduct
aggressive oversight of these decisions. The O.I.C.'s Office of the Consumer
Advocate should be notified each time that a worker is to be placed on opioids,
so that the worker can receive a particularized statement of his or her rights to

138

Id.

139

Id.
Id

140
141
142

W. VA. CODER. § 85-20-53.12.d 2006).
See id §§ 85-20-49 to -51, 85-20-49-53 to -62.
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appeal that decision and so that the Consumer Advocate can intervene preemptively to ensure that opioids are not prescribed when physical therapy or
surgery would alleviate the underlying causes of pain.
. Congress may enhance protection for recovering addicts by expanding
recovery services through the federal Rehabilitation Services Administration and
by facilitating access to group therapy programs that use best practices under
Medicare and Medicaid. At the state level, interagency and public-private
coordination efforts can support recovering addicts through WorkForce West
Virginia, Adult Education, the Division of Rehabilitation Services, and the State
Rehabilitation Council.
Finally, the EEOC and the state and local fair employment agencies must
acknowledge and prioritize the pursuit of claims for failures to accommodate and
discrimination involving addiction. Such efforts are necessary to accomplish the
goals of the ADA and the state human rights acts, which wisely intend to provide
such protections as an important component of our comprehensive public policy
combatting addiction. Such efforts will also help to reduce stigma and to increase
access to successful treatment and long-term recovery programs for workers who
find themselves ensnared, boxed out, and broken down by the American
epidemic of addiction.
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